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Comments and Casenotes
LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS
The history of the Maryland version of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act has been far from happy.
Originally passed as Chapter 294 of the Laws of 1939,1
the Act, for all practical purposes, was driven from the
local scene by a series of opinions decided by the Court of
Appeals which, in effect, held that no relief by way of
declaratory judgment could be obtained if there existed
any other available and adequate remedy at law or in
equity.' This view, though severely criticized both by
the REVIEW 3 and by the leading authority on the subject 4
as being contrary to the expressed intent of the General
Assembly, successfully survived.5
In an effort to preserve the beneficial progress and
practical usefulness of the Act, and at the same time to
declare its actual intention with respect to the subject,
the General Assembly has repealed and re-enacted, with
amendments, Article 31A of the Annotated Code.' The
significance of the repealer is highlighted by a series of
"whereas" recitals which acknowledge the fact that the
Court of Appeals had held that a proceeding for a declara-
tory judgment was not appropriate within the contempla-
tion of the Uniform Act if there existed an immediate
cause of action between the parties for which one of the
common remedies at law or in equity was adequate and
available. The recitals further emphasize that it was the
sense of the General Assembly that the real legislative
IMd. Code (1939), Art. 31A.
2 The most damaging decisions were Porcelain Enamel & Manufacturing
Co. v. Jeffrey Co., 177 Md. 677, 11 A. (2d) 480 (1940); Caroline Street
Permanent Building Association v. Sohn, 178 Md. 434, 13 A. (2d) 616
(1940) ; Morgan v. Deitrich, 179 Md. 199, 16 A. (2d) 916 (1940); Davis v.
State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A. (2d) 880 (1944).
Case, Declaratory Judgments in Maryland (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev. 221.
'BoRRcAD, DoLARATOR Y JUDGMENTS (2d Ed. 1941) 325-327.
5 Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A. (2d) 880 (1944). See also Brown
v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 181 Md. 80, 28 A. (2d) 582 (1942), in which
the Court granted relief by way of a declaratory judgment after an ex-
tended discussion of the Act, 'but added that the principles of declaratory
relief were substantially the same under the Uniform Act as under the
Act of 1888, Ch. 478, Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, See. 29. This dictum is
not in accord with the better reasoned cases.
OMd. Laws 1945, Ch. 724.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
intent in the passage of the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act was that the existence of another adequate
remedy at law or in equity should not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases in which it was appropriate.
In the light of these recitals, it can hardly be questioned
that the new Maryland Declaratory Judgments Act has
been passed for the expressed purpose of establishing a
procedure which may be used as alternative to the existing
remedies available at law or in equity. Moreover, it would
seem clear that the decisions of the Court of Appeals which
had held to the contrary have been effectively set aside.
Chapter 724 of the Laws of 1945 made two important
changes in the wording of the Act. In order to correct
certain erroneous reasoning found in at least one late
Maryland decision,7 the clause "nor shall the existence of
another adequate remedy preclude a judgment for declara-
tory relief in cases where it is appropriate" 8 is omitted
from Section 1 of the new law. This clause, which was
obviously inserted in the original version of the Act to
guarantee that declaratory procedure would be construed
to be alternative to existing remedies,9 had been relied upon
by the Court of Appeals as authority for holding that the
existence of one of the common remedies at law or in
equity would preclude the use of declaratory relief.10 This
result had been reached by isolating the phrase "in cases
where it is appropriate," and by stating that a declaratory
judgment was inappropriate where the litigant could resort
to an existing remedy at law or in equity. The deletion
of this clause, coupled with the expressed statement of
legislative intent found in the "whereas" recitals, should
effectively preclude such reasoning in future cases.
The most sweeping change made by Chapter 724 ap-
pears in Section 6 of the new Act. Prior to its amendment,
Section 6 in substance had provided that courts of record
could refuse to enter a declaratory judgment or decree
7 Davis v. Sate, 183 Md. 385, 389, 37 A. (2d) 880, 883 (1944).
' Md. Code (1939) Art. 31a, Sec. 1.
9 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d Ed. 1941) 325.
1o0In the Davis case, supra, n. 5, the Court said, at 183 Md. 389:
"Section 1 of the Uniform Act explicitly declares that the existence
of another adequate remedy shall not preclude a judgment for declara-
tory relief 'in cases where it is appropriate'. However, we have
decided that the Act is designed to supplement, not to supersede,
existing remedies at law and in equity, and accordingly where an imme-
diate cause of action exists for which one of the existing remedies
is available and adequate, a proceeding for a declaratory judgment
is not appropriate within the contemplation of the Act."
For a full discussion of the early decisions which had established this rule,
see Case, Declaratory Judgments in Maryland (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev. 221.
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where such declaratory judgment or decree, if rendered or
entered, would not terminate the uncertainty of contro-
versy giving rise to the proceeding." This Section has
been repealed and in its place the new Act provides:' 2
Relief by declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted in all civil cases in which an actual contro-
versy exists between contending parties, or in which
the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are pres-
ent between the parties involved which indicate immi-
nent and inevitable litigation, or when in any such
case the court is satisfied that a party asserts a legal
relation, status, right, or privilege in which he has
a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or
denial of such asserted relation, status, right or privi-
lege by an adversary party who also has or asserts a
concrete interest therein, and the court is satisfied also
that a declaratory judgment or decree shall serve to
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise
to the proceedings. When, however, a statute pro-
vides a special form of remedy for a specific type of
case, that statutory remedy must be followed; but
the mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy
is susceptible of relief thrdugh a general common law
remedy, or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary
legal remedy, whether such remedy is recognized or
regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party
from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment or decree in any case in which the other essen-
tials to such relief are present; but proceeding by
declaratory judgment shall not be permitted in any
case in which divorce or annulment of marriage is
sought. The Court may order a speedy hearing of an
action for a declaratory judgment, and may advance it
on the calendar.
The amendment to Section 6 is patterned after a similar
change which was made two years ago in the Pennsylvania
version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act."
Originally drafted by Chief Justice Von Moschzisker of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after his retirement from
the bench, the amendment was specifically designed to
rescue the Pennsylvania Act from a line of decisions which
1 Md. Code (1939) Art. 31a, Sec. 6.12 Md. Laws 1945, Oh. 724, Sec. 6.




had in effect emasculated it by judicial legislation.14
These decisions, like the now overruled opinions of the
Maryland Court of Appeals, had held that the declaratory
procedure could not be used if another remedy at law or
in equity was available. 15 This result had been reached
despite the fact that the Pennsylvania Act had received
at the outset a clear construction to the effect that the
declaratory judgment procedure was designed to offer an-
other method by which a party could call upon the courts
to adjudicate his rights.16
While it is not altogether clear why the Court of Ap-
peals refused to favor the original Maryland Declaratory
Judgments Act with a construction in line with the over-
whelming weight of authority elsewhere, it is abundantly
clear that the General Assembly has refused to sanction
the line of decisions which for all practical purposes wrote
the Act out of existence on the grounds of legislative in-
tent. That the new Act provides an alternative remedy to
ordinary methods of procedure available at law or in
equity cannot be questioned. The Act specifically states
that it is not applicable to cases for which a statute pro-
vides a special form of remedy, but recites that it may
apply to all cases for which a statute recognizes that the
controversy is susceptible to relief through a general
common law or equity remedy.17 The only exceptions in
14 Borchard, Pennsylvania's Clarifying Amendnent For Declaratory Judg-
ments (1944) 92 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 50, 50-51.
15 The latest Pennsylvania cases on the subject are Stofflet & Tillotson
v. Chester Housing Authority, 346 Pa. 574, 31 A. (2d) 274 (1943) ; Valley
R. R. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. 346 Pa. 579, 31 A. (2d)
276 (1943). Earlier cases included Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263,
142 A. 224 (1928) ; Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374,
165 A. 403 (1933) ; Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 A. 571
(1934).
16 Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A. 265 (1925). It is of para-
mount significance that the opinion in this case was written by Chief
Justice Von Moschzisker, who subsequently drafted the amendment to the
Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act from which the Maryland amend-
ment was taken. In the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Von Mosch-
zisker said, at page 471:
"The declaratory-judgment procedure offers another method by which
a party can call on the courts to adjudicate his rights, but it is the
same as exising methods in that it follows due process of law."
", The only decision to date which has attempted to construe the new
Act is Rustless Iron & Steel Corporation et al. v. Public Service Commis-
sion et al., Circuit Court of Baltimore City, The Daily Record, July 16, 1945.
In this case, a complaint was filed on May 23, 1944, by the People's Counsel
for the State of Maryland with the Public Service Commission as a result
of which the Commission undertook an investigation of the reasonableness
of the electric rates charged by the Consolidated Gas Electric Light and
Power Company of Baltimore. On April 18, 1945, the Commission, at the
request of the Consolidated, issued and served on the parties a document
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the latter group of cases are suits for divorce and annul-
ment of marriage. It thus appears that with the exception
of cases for which a statute specifically provides a special
form of remedy and in divorce and annulment proceedings,
Maryland litigants may now choose as a method for seek-
ing judicial relief either one of the established remedies at
law or in equity or the more expeditious and less quarrel-
some method of suit for declaratory judgment. If the
second choice is made and contested, it is to be hoped that
the Court of Appeals will construe the new Act in the spirit
in which it was re-enacted by the General Assembly.
RECENT CHANGES AFFECTING MINORITY STOCK-
HOLDERS' SUITS
It is a familiar principle that the right to control the
affairs and management of a corporation and to dictate its
policies can be exercised by the majority of the holders
of stock having voting power in that corporation. The
rights of the minority stockholders are not many. In gen-
eral they are protected only against fraudulent, illegal and
ultra vires acts of the majority.1 This protection can be
obtained by the use of the device known as the minority
stockholders bill. Recently in Maryland, the use of this
device has been limited by a decision of the Court of
Appeals and by legislative enactment.
In Eisler v. Eastern States Corporation2 the Court of
Appeals was faced with the problem of the right of a
entitled a "Memorandum" which in effect stated that the property of the
Consolidated should 'be considered as a whole for the purpose of deter-
mining its rate base. Subsequently, Rustless Iron & Steel Corporation,
an intervenor before the Commission, filed a bill of complaint In the Circuit
Court of Baltimore -City, which sought a reversal of the so-called "Memo-
randum". One of the arguments urged by the plaintiff (or more accu-
rately the Appellant) was that it was entitled to relief under the new
Declaratory Judgments Act. The Court denied this contention on two
grounds, 1. e. that the litigation was of a type for which a statute provided
a special form of remedy, and that the present case was an appeal which
was not regulated or controlled by the Act. With respect to the first
point, It should be observed that where another statute has specifically
provided for a method of procedure that the Act may not be used. This re-
sults from the obvious fact that the General Assembly did not Intend that
a declaratory judgment should be sought where it had previously provided
a specific form of proceeding for a special type of case. Where such a
statute exists, therefore, litigants should be bound to seek relief thereunder,
and in such cases the alternative argument that If relief cannot be ob-
tained thereby it should be forthcoming under the Declaratory Judgments
Act should not be countenanced.
I 18 C. J. S. (Corporations) §496.
2182 Md. 329, 35 A. (2d) 118 (1943).
